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Enforceability of Predispute Arbitration
Agreements Under the Federal Securities
Laws: Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon
I. Introduction
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,1 a di-
vided U.S. Supreme Court resolved the controversy which had
arisen among the U.S. circuit courts of appeals. At issue was the
enforceability of a written agreement between a securities bro-
kerage firm and its customers which stated that any future con-
troversy which might arise between them would be resolved
through arbitration2 rather than in a judicial forum.3 In ac-
cepting this case, the Supreme Court was faced with the task of
reconciling the policy of investor protection furthered by the Se-
curities/Exchange Act of 1934" (the "Exchange Act"), with the
policy of expeditious and economical resolution of disputes pro-
moted by the Federal Arbitration Act6 (the "Arbitration Act").
The McMahon Court held that predispute arbitration agree-
ments are enforceable for claims arising under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act. This holding conflicts with case law in eight
of the ten circuits which have decided the issue, and reverses a
long-standing Second Circuit precedent.'
1. 107 S. Ct. 2332, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 31 (1987).
2. Black's Law Dictionary defines arbitration as "[tihe reference of a dispute to an
impartial (third) person chosen by the parties to the dispute who agree in advance to
abide by the arbitrator's award issued after a hearing at which both parties have an
opportunity to be heard." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979). See also S. EAGER,
THE ARBITRATION CONTRACT AND PROCEEDINGS § 1 (1971) (arbitration defined as "a pro-
ceeding whereby, pursuant to the agreement of parties, disputes or controversies between
them, without regard to the justifiable nature thereof, are submitted by them for deter-
mination by an individual or individuals rather than by a court or judge acting in a
judicial capacity"). Arbitration is not defined in the Arbitration Act.
3. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2335. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) (as amended).
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) (as amended).
6. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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Prior to the passage of the Arbitration Act in 1925, agree-
ments to resolve legal disputes in a forum other than the courts
were unenforceable and perceived as attempts to "oust" the
courts from their lawful jurisdiction.7 However, the Arbitration
Act changed judicial perception of this alternate method of dis-
pute resolution by providing that written arbitration agreements
are valid and enforceable.8 In 1953, despite this strong federal
policy favoring arbitration, the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilko v. Swan9 created an exception to the provisions of the Ar-
bitration Act. The Court ruled that predispute arbitration agree-
ments were unenforceable as to claims arising under the Securi-
ties Act of 193310 (the "Securities Act"). In the wake of Wilko,
federal courts were faced with the issue of whether to extend
this holding to claims arising under the Exchange Act. Without
a clear directive from the Supreme Court, during the thirty-two
years following Wilko, lower federal court decisions resulted in a
split among the circuit courts of appeals as to the enforceability
of predispute arbitration agreements involving section 10(b)
claims brought under the Exchange Act.11
In McMahon, the Court not only resolved this long-standing
controversy but also reaffirmed its increasingly favorable atti-
tude toward arbitration.12 However, as strongly as the Court fa-
vors arbitration, it did not use McMahon as an opportunity to
overrule Wilko.13 Consequently, while predispute arbitration
agreements may henceforth be held enforceable for claims
brought under the Exchange Act, they remain unenforceable for
claims brought under the Securities Act.
Part II of this Note provides background discussions of the
Arbitration Act, the Securities Act, and the Exchange Act, and
traces the evolution of this important securities issue from its
roots in the Wilko decision through the confusion that decision
spawned in the lower federal courts. The Supreme Court deci-
7. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6 (1985).
8. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337.
9. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) (as amended). See infra text accompanying note
60.
11. See cases cited infra note 187.
12. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338-39.
13. Id. at 2341.
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sion in McMahon is presented in Part III of this Note. Part IV
provides a discussion of whether predispute arbitration agree-
ments should be enforceable for claims brought under the Ex-
change Act. This Note concludes, in Part V, that predispute ar-
bitration agreements are properly enforceable for claims arising
under the Exchange Act and that Securities Act claims may
soon also be subject to such agreements.
II. Background
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Most securities brokers and dealers require that investors
sign an agreement detailing the nature and terms of an invest-
ment and the legal relationship between the broker and inves-
tor.14 The investment agreement that an individual investor
commonly enters into frequently contains an arbitration clause.
The standard arbitration clause, designed to anticipate all likely
disputes which might develop between the investor and the bro-
ker, states that any controversy which may subsequently arise
concerning the account will be resolved through arbitration. 5
Arbitration is favored as a means of dispute resolution be-
cause it is generally less expensive and less time consuming than
litigation. 6 Fees are greatly reduced in arbitration because there
is no discovery or motion practice, and awards are generally con-
14. Notice to Broker-Dealers Concerning Clauses in Customer-Agreements Which
Provide for Arbitration of Future Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,122 (July 2, 1979).
15. Arbitration clauses commonly state:
Any controversy between you and the undersigned arising out of or relating to this
contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with
the rules, then obtaining, of either the Arbitration Committee of the Chamber of
Commerce of the State of N.Y., or the American Arbitration Association or the
Board of Arbitration of the N.Y. Stock Exchange, as the undersigned may elect.
8A C. NICHOLS, CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMS ANNOTATED § 8.5862, at 496 (1980).
16. See Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Co., 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D.D.C. 1972) (the
basic purpose of arbitration is to relieve parties from costly litigation and help ease con-
gested court dockets); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,
410 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960) ("[A]ny doubts as to the con-
struction of the [Arbitration] Act ought to be resolved in line with its liberal policy of
promoting arbitration both to accord with the original intention of the parties and to
help ease . . . congestion of court calendars."). See generally Note, The New Federal
Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265 (1926) (summarizing the provisions of the Arbitra-
tion Act).
1988]
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sidered nonappealable. 17 In addition, since arbitration proceed-
ings are private, there is diminished fear among the parties of
adverse publicity resulting from the decision.18
Prior to enactment of the Arbitration Act in 1925, many
courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements.19 However, the
Arbitration Act expressly provides that such decisions are no
longer valid. Section 2 of the Arbitration Act mandates that "a
written provision in .. .a contract evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."20 If an ac-
tion is brought before a court involving an issue which may be
referred to arbitration, the court must stay litigation of the ac-
tion pending arbitration.2 As a preliminary matter, the review-
17. Robbins, A Practitioner's Guide to Securities Dispute Resolution, 535 PRACTIC-
ING LAW INST. 17, 22-26 (1986).
18. Id. at 25.
19. See, e.g., Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152, 158, 139 N.E. 95, 98 (1923) (The court
held the predispute agreement void because it deprived the parties of their guaranteed
constitutional rights of access to the courts. In "an executory contract, an agreement that
any dispute that may arise under it shall be submitted to arbitration ... is void." (foot-
notes omitted)).
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Although this Note is only concerned with predispute arbi-
tration agreements, section 2 of the Arbitration Act also provides for the enforcement of
an arbitration agreement with respect to an existing controversy. See, e.g., Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Arbitration agreements entered
into after a controversy has arisen are enforceable.). See generally Note, Arbitration of
Investor-Broker Disputes 65 CALIF. L. REv. 120, 137-41 (1977) (discussion of arbitration
of existing securities disputes). Commerce is defined as:
[C]ommerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory
of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory
and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or
between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
21. The Arbitration Act requires that:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with
such arbitration.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss1/5
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ing court must decide whether a valid arbitration agreement ex-
ists between the parties, and whether the claim before the court
is governed by the agreement. 22 This procedure was illustrated
in Gait v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.,2" where the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a federal court asked
to compel arbitration 21 is assigned the limited role of deciding
whether an arbitration agreement has been entered into, and, if
so, whether that agreement has been breached.25
Supreme Court decisions during the past twenty years have
indicated an increasingly favorable attitude toward arbitration.
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,26
the Court stated that it must honor not only the "plain meaning
of the [Arbitration Act] but also the unmistakably clear congres-
sional" intent that a contract to arbitrate be upheld and "not
subject to delay and obstruction in the courts. 21
The Court expressed its acceptance of arbitration again in
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,25 where it stated that a federal court should "move the
parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
22. The Arbitration Act states:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the
court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed [with] arbitration ....
If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to
perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial
thereof.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). In Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., the court stated:
[A] court may not order arbitration until it is satisfied that a valid arbitration
agreement exists. Any claim of fraud, duress or unconscionability in the formation
of the arbitration agreement is a matter for judicial consideration .... Allegations
of unconscionability in the contract as a whole, however, are matters to be re-
solved in arbitration.
791 F.2d 850, 854 (11th Cir. 1986).
23. 376 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1967).
24. An order denying a motion to compel arbitration is appealable under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1) (1982) "as an interlocutory decision refusing an injunction in an action re-
questing legal relief." Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61
(8th Cir. 1984).
25. Galt, 376 F.2d at 714 (quoting Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Harrisons
& Crosfield, 204 F.2d 366, 368 (2d Cir. 1953)).
26. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
27. Id. at 404.
28. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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as quickly and easily as possible." '29 The Court stated that the
Arbitration Act represents a "liberal federal policy favoring arbi-
tration agreements" which creates a "body of federal substantive
law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement
within the coverage of the [Arbitration] Act." 0 Finally, the
Court indicated that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbi-
trable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. . .. "31
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,32 the Supreme Court was
called upon to examine a California court's determination that
the arbitration agreement at issue was unenforceable. The state
court had based its decision upon a California statute which in-
validated such arbitration agreements. 3 Relying on its decision
in Moses H. Cone,-4 the Court held that the Arbitration Act pre-
empted state courts from limiting arbitration, and stated that
"[c]ontracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one
party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts. '3 5
Recently, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,36 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the trend to-
ward arbitration by ruling that a federal antitrust dispute, based
on an international trade agreement, was subject to arbitra-
tion.3 7 The Court stated that it must first be determined
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute.38 In making
this determination, a reviewing court must examine any claims
of "fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide
29. Id. at 22. The arbitration agreement at issue in Moses H. Cone was contained in
a construction contract. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id. at 24-25. See also Galt, 376 F.2d at 714-15 (arbitration agreements should be
liberally construed and any doubts as to the enforceability of the agreement resolved in
favor of arbitration).
32. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
33. Id. at 3. "Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person
acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or
order hereunder is void." Id. at 10 (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977)).
34. 460 U.S. at 1.
35. Southland, 465 U.S. at 7.
36. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
37. Id. at 640. Accord, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (holding
predispute arbitration agreements enforceable in an international dispute). See infra
text accompanying notes 95-118.
38. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
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grounds 'for the revocation of any contract.' "31 In the absence of
these factors, an agreement to arbitrate should be enforced. The
Court also stated that actions founded on statutory rights are
not automatically exempt from arbitration, and that the Arbi-
tration Act provides no basis for disfavoring such agreements.4 °
Finally, the Court concluded that "[h]aving made the bargain to
arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself
has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial reme-
dies for the statutory rights at issue."' 1
The liberal pro-arbitration stance adopted by the Court in
Prima, Moses H. Cone, Southland, and Mitsubishi, accords well
with the intent of Congress, evidenced in the Arbitration Act, to
expedite the settlement of claims and ease burdensome conges-
tion in the courts.'2 Once it has been determined that a valid
arbitration agreement exists, the only additional limitation on
the availablity of arbitration is that there be an underlying com-
mercial transaction. 3 Since violations of the federal securities
laws clearly involve matters of commerce, all federal securities
claims are potentially subject to the Arbitration Act.
B. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Wilko Doctrine
1. The Securities Act
Although it may appear that the provisions of the Arbitra-
tion Act are enforceable in all situations where a valid arbitra-
tion agreement exists, exceptions have been recognized. One
such exception involves the Securities Act.
The Securities Act regulates the original issuance of securi-
ties. The primary purpose of the Securities Act is to protect the
investor." Protection is accomplished by compelling disclosure
of all material information in public offerings, preventing fraud
and misrepresentation in the interstate sale of securities, and
granting investors access to a judicial forum to resolve any dis-
putes which may arise in connection with the investment activ-
39. Id. at 627 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 628.
42. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
44. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 427, 431 (1953).
1988]
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ity.45 Protection against fraudulent acts is afforded the investor,
in part, through the express liability provision contained in the
Securities Act. Section 12(2) provides the investor with a "spe-
cial right"4 6 to recover for misrepresentation by the seller of a
security.47 The right has been deemed "special" because, con-
trary to common law, the defendant seller bears the burden of
proving that no misrepresentation has taken place.48
Under the section 22(a) jurisdiction provision of the Securi-
ties Act, an investor may seek enforcement of a section 12(2)
claim in any court of competent jurisdiction against a broker
who has misrepresented or omitted information involving the
sale of securities.49 This right provides the investor with all the
advantages normally afforded in an action brought in the federal
courts, including a broad choice of venue and the availability of
nationwide service of process ° In addition, the Securities Act
imposes civil and criminal liabilities for knowing or unreasona-
ble material misstatements or failures to disclose required infor-
mation. 1 Thus, the enactment of the Securities Act is clear evi-
45. Id.; Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 113-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
46. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
47. The Securities Act states that any person who
offers or sells a security.., by the use of any means or instruments of transporta-
tion or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a pro-
spectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the
purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction ....
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
48. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. Unlike section 12(2) of the Securities Act, section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act places the burden on the purchaser to prove the seller's culpability.
49. Any suit brought under the Securities Act may
be brought in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or
transacts business, or in the district where the offer or sale took place, if the de-
fendant participated therein, and process in such cases may be served in any other
district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be
found.
15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1982).
50. Id.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2), 77o (1982) (civil liabilities); 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982)
(criminal penalties).
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dence of Congress' strong policy of investor protection.
2. The Wilko Doctrine - Arbitration Agreements Are
Not Enforceable For Securities Act Claims
In 1953, Congress' policy of investor protection clashed di-
rectly with its emerging policy in favor of enforcing arbitration
agreements. As a result, in Wilko v. Swan,52 the Supreme Court
carved out an exception to the Arbitration Act for claims arising
under the Securities Act.5"
In Wilko, an investor brought suit against the partners in a
securities brokerage firm to recover damages under section 12(2)
of the Securities Act.54 The investor claimed that the brokerage
firm had induced him to purchase shares of stock by falsely rep-
resenting the value of the stock.5 The investor's contract with
the brokerage firm included a standard arbitration clause, 56 and
the respondent, without answering the complaint, moved to stay
the trial pursuant to section 3 of the Arbitration Act 57 until arbi-
tration was held. A divided Second Circuit held that the Secur-
ities Act did not prohibit the use of predispute arbitration
agreements.59
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding
that predispute arbitration agreements are void as to claims
arising under the Securities Act.6 0 The majority decision was
based on a number of factors. First, the Court noted that the
52. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
53. Id. See Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850, 852 (11th Cir.
1986) (claims under section 12(2) of the Securities Act are "clearly not arbitrable").
54. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428.
55. Id. at 428-29.
56. The arbitration clause at issue in Wilko stated:
Any controversy arising between us under this contract shall be determined
by arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Law of the State of New York, and
under the rules of either the Arbitration Committee of the Chamber of Commerce
of the State of New York, or of the American Arbitration Association, or of the
Arbitration Committee of the New York Stock Exchange or such other Exchange
as may have jurisdiction over the matter in dispute, as I may elect. Any arbitra-
tion hereunder shall be before at least three arbitrators.
Id. at 432 n.15.
57. See supra note 22.
58. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429.
59. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953).
60. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
1988]
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policy behind the the Securities Act was to protect investors, ad-
ding to the "ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine
of 'let the seller also beware .. ' ."61 The Court stated that this
policy was effectuated through section 12(2), which "created a
special right" to recover for misrepresentation in any court of
competent jurisdiction.2 The Court emphasized that this special
right differs from comparable common-law actions in that it re-
lieves the investor of the burden of proving scienter and grants
the investor a wide choice of venue and nationwide service of
process.6 3
The majority in Wilko recognized the competing policies be-
hind the Securities Act and the Arbitration Act - investor pro-
tection versus a speedy and economical resolution of disputes."
The majority also noted that the Arbitration Act established
"the desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the complica-
tions of litigation."" However, relying on section 14 of the Se-
curities Act, the Court held that an investor's rights to a trial
under the Securities Act may not be waived. 6 The section 14
nonwaiver provision specifically provides that "[any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any secur-
ity to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or
of the rules and regulations of the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission shall be void. '6 7 The Court concluded that a predis-
pute arbitration agreement is a "stipulation" that "waives com-
pliance" with the provisions of section 22(a) of the Securities
Act, which allows the investor the right to select the judicial fo-
rum. 6 The Court reasoned that, although a buyer and a seller of
securities may deal at arm's length in some situations, such is
61. Id. at 430 (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933)).
62. Id. at 431.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 438.
65. Id. at 431. "The reports of both houses on [the Arbitration] Act stress the need
for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation, and practice under its terms raises hope
for its usefulness both in controversies based on statutes or on standards otherwise cre-
ated." Id. at 431-32 (footnotes omitted).
66. Id. at 435.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
68. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35. Specifically, section 22(a) of the Securities Act affords
the plaintiff a choice of state or federal judicial forums, a broad choice of venue, and
nationwide service of process. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982). See supra note 49; see infra
note 88.
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not always the case. Indeed, "the Securities Act was drafted
with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor.
70
Recognizing that "[i]ssuers of and dealers in securities have bet-
ter opportunities to investigate and appraise" the business plans
affecting securities than do buyers, the Court deemed it "reason-
able for Congress to put buyers of securities covered by [the Se-
curities] Act on a different basis from other purchasers." 71
It is clear that a waiver of the right to a trial would cause a
securities investor to forego not only the special right afforded
him by statute, but also certain procedural advantages available
at trial. The adjudication of a securities claim through arbitra-
tion "requires... findings on the purpose and knowledge of an
alleged violator of the [Securities] Act. [Such findings] must be
not only determined but applied by the arbitrators without judi-
cial instructions on the law."'72 Further, since the arbitrators' de-
cision does not require an explanation of their reasoning or a
"complete record of [the] proceedings, the arbitrators' concep-
tion of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as 'bur-
den of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material fact,' . . , cannot be
examined. '73 Also, the power to vacate an arbitral award is lim-
ited."4 An arbitration award may only be vacated upon the show-
ing of a gross abuse of discretion or upon a showing of fraud,
bias, or corruption.7 5 Based on the foregoing, the Court con-
69. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 435-36.
73. Id. at 436.
74. Id.
75. The Arbitration Act states:
[T]he United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may
make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbi-
tration -
(a) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or ei-
ther of them.
(c) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
19881
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cluded that while the policies behind the Arbitration Act and
the Securities Act are "not easily reconcilable," the "intention of
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by
holding invalid [a predispute] agreement for arbitration of issues
arising under the [Securities] Act." 76
Disagreeing with the majority's mistrust of arbitration, the
dissent in Wilko stated that there is nothing to indicate that the
arbitral system "would not afford the plaintiff the rights to
which he is entitled."'77 In support of this position, the dissenting
Justices stated that the advantages of the Arbitration Act - "a
speedier, more economical and more effective enforcement of
rights" - coupled with the fact that the arbitrators are re-
quired to follow the law by rendering their decisions in accor-
dance with the provisions of section 12(2) of the Securities Act,
led to the conclusion that a valid arbitration agreement should
have been upheld.7
C. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Exchange Act extends the policy of investor protection
formulated in the Securities Act by regulating the trading of se-
curities subsequent to their original issuance. 7 The primary
purpose of the Exchange Act is to protect interstate commerce
and the national credit, to ensure a fair and honest market for
the trading of securities,80 and "to protect [securities] investors
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of trans-
actions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter mar-
kets .. ."1 The Exchange Act and the Securities Act collectively
"constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory
scheme governing transactions in securities" ' 2 and collectively
(e) where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement re-
quired the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
76. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
77. Id. at 439 (Frankfurter & Minton, JJ., dissenting).
78. Id. at 439-40.
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
80. Id.
81. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934)).
82. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 206. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
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further the congressional purpose of "protect[ing] investors
against false and deceptive practices that might injure them."83
The Exchange Act contains numerous provisions analogous
to those found in the Securities Act. Specifically, the provisions
relating to civil liability, jurisdiction, and nonwaiver are remark-
ably similar, albeit not identical.
Similar to the section 12(2) civil liability provision of the
Securities Act, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the
use of manipulative or deceptive devices in the purchase or sale
of securities.8 4 Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Commission") promulgated Rule 10b-5 for
the purpose of identifying practices that violate section 10(b). 6
Touted as a "'catchall' clause," section 10(b) "enable[d] the
Commission 'to deal with new manipulative [or cunning] de-
vices.' , Unlike section 12(2), section 10(b) does not expressly
provide for a private right of action; however, case law has im-
plied such a right.8 7
The jurisdictional provision of the Exchange Act, though
similar to the Securities Act provision, is more restrictive. Sec-
tion 27 of the Exchange Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the
federal courts, while section 22 of the Securities Act provides
concurrent jurisdiction between the federal and state courts.88
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727-30 (1975) (describing the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
as "two landmark statutes regulating securities").
83. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 198.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). See generally Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197-201
(discussion of scienter requirement in an action for damages under § 10(b)).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
86. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 203.
87. Id. at 196. ("Although Section 10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil
remedy for its violation .... the existence of a private cause of action for violations of the
statute and the Rule is now well-established.") (footnote omitted). Accord Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa.
1946). See generally Herman & MacLean v. Huddelston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-81 n.10
(1983) (summarizes the implied right of action under § 10(b)). Unlike the implied right
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, §12(2) of the Securities Act expressly provides for a
civil remedy. See supra note 47 for text of § 12(2).
88. Section 22(a) of the Securities Act provides in relevant part that federal courts
"shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this [title] and under the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto, [concurrent] with
State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this [title]." 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982). Conversely, sec-
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Finally, the nonwaiver provisions of the statutes are almost
identical. Both section 14 of the Securities Act and section 29(a)
of the Exchange Act prohibit any condition which would bind an
individual to waive compliance with any provision contained in
the statutes."9
1. Extension of the Wilko Doctrine to Exchange Act
Claims
Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Wilko that claims aris-
ing under the Securities Act are not arbitrable, uncertainty has
surfaced among the courts as to whether predispute arbitration
agreements are enforceable for claims arising under the Ex-
change Act. Generally, federal courts have extended the Wilko
doctrine to claims arising under the Exchange Act." An early
example of this practice is Reader v. Hirsch & Co. 1 Supporting
its application of the Wilko doctrine to an Exchange Act claim,
the Reader court stated that the forum clause and nonwaiver
provisions in the Exchange Act are equivalent to those found in
the Securities Act.92 Additionally, the court weighed the benefits
tion 27 of the Exchange Act provides in relevant part that federal courts "shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this [title] or the rules and regulations thereunder,
and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this [title] or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
89. See supra text accompanying note 67 for text of section 14 of the Securities Act.
Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule
or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982).
90. See, e.g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 (8th
Cir. 1984) (Although the issue was not before the court, Surman stated that lower fed-
eral courts have consistently held that Wilko applies to claims arising under the Ex-
change Act.); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979)
(Wilko doctrine applies to claims under the Exchange Act). See also Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978) (policy of non-waiver
provision of Securities Act is embodied in Exchange Act non-waiver provision); Sibley v.
Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977) (The simi-
larities between the Securities Act and the Exchange Act outweigh the differences, and
therefore Wilko applies to both acts.); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F.
Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (The reasoning in Wilko applies to claims brought under the
Exchange Act.); SECURITIES AcTs AMENDMENTS OF 1975. H.R. REP. No. 229, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 342 (The 1975
amendments to the Exchange Act do not alter existing law under the Wilko doctrine.).
91. 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
92. Id. at 115-16.
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of arbitration against its potential disadvantages.9 3 The Reader
court concluded that the "abandonment of the buyer's right to
choose his forum, and potential abandonment of other rights
under the [Exchange] Act . . . can offer the buyer no greater
advantage than exists under the [Exchange] Act," and in fact
may prove to operate only to his disadvantage. 4
2. The Supreme Court Casts Doubt on the Applicability
of the Wilko Doctrine to Exchange Act Claims
Prior to McMahon, the Supreme Court had not ruled on
whether the reasoning espoused in Wilko was applicable to the
Exchange Act. However, two recent Supreme Court cases im-
plied that such agreements may be enforceable. In Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co.,95 the Supreme Court examined this issue and
carved out a special niche for predispute arbitration agreements
in an international agreement.9 6 Scherk involved an interna-
tional commercial transaction for the sale of a business through
the purchase of securities. 7 The purchase contract contained an
agreement to arbitrate all disputes before the International
Chamber of Commerce in France.9 8 Alberto-Culver, the pur-
chaser of the securities, alleged fraudulent misrepresentation in
violation of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.9 The Court weighed various factors,
including the potential effects of its decision on international
trade and the protective policy behind the federal securities
laws, before holding (in a five to four decision) that the arbitra-
tion agreement contained in the purchase contract was
enforceable. 100
In reaching its decision, the Court stated, in dictum, that a
93. Id. at 116.
94. Id.
95. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
96. Id. at 519-20.
97. Id. at 508.
98. Id. The contract for the sale of the business entities owned by Scherk stipulated
that the laws of the State of Illinois, Alberto-Culver's principal place of business, would
apply in any arbitration proceeding. Id.
99. Id. at 509.
100. Id. at 519-20. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist comprised the majority, with Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and
Marshall dissenting. Id. at 507.
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"colorable argument" could be made that the Wilko doctrine
does not apply to claims brought under the Exchange Act be-
cause the language of the Exchange Act differs from the lan-
guage of the Securities Act. 10' The majority reasoned that there
is no provision in the Exchange Act which is analogous to sec-
tion 12(2) insofar as section 12(2) provides a "special right of a
private remedy."'1 2 Neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 ex-
pressly provides a private remedy to redress violations.' The
Scherk Court further stated that, while federal case law has es-
tablished that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 create an implied
private cause of action,'0 "the [Exchange Act] itself does not
establish the 'special right' that the Court in Wilko found signif-
icant."'10 5 Additionally, while both the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act contain sections barring waiver of compliance with
any "provisions" of such statutes (section 14 and section 29(a),
respectively), 0 6 the Securities Act provision which the Wilko
Court held nonwaivable has no actual counterpart in the Ex-
change Act.107 The Court noted that the forum provision con-
tained in section 22 of the Securities Act allows the plaintiff to
bring suit in any court of competent jurisdiction, but the analo-
gous provision contained in section 27 of the Exchange Act pro-
vides federal district courts with "exclusive jurisdiction" in such
matters. 0 8 The Court reasoned that the Exchange Act "signifi-
cantly restrict[s] the plaintiff's choice of forum," and therefore
does not contain the broad forum selection options which the
Wilko Court stated could not be waived.10 9
The Court's decision in Scherk, however, did not rely on the
differences in the language between the Securities Act and the
101. Id. at 513.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
105. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14.
106. See supra note 89.
107. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
108. Id. See supra note 88.
109. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514. See Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
795 F.2d 1393, 1397 (8th Cir. 1986) (The jurisdictional provision of the Exchange Act is
narrower than that found in the Securities Act.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3218 (1987). But
see Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1986) (exclusive
jurisdiction of Exchange Act cases is a strong indication that the courts have preference
for such cases being under their control), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3203 (1987).
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Exchange Act, nor did it explicitly decide whether the Wilko
doctrine should be extended to claims under the Exchange
Act. 110 Rather, the Court upheld the enforceability of the arbi-
tration agreement by distinguishing the relevant facts at bar
from those surrounding the Wilko case.' The Court stated that
the "crucial difference" between Scherk and Wilko was the fact
that Scherk involved an international agreement and that
"[s]uch a contract involves considerations and policies signifi-
cantly different from those found controlling in Wilko." 2 The
Court emphasized that arbitration agreements between parties
to an international agreement are necessary to maintain the or-
derliness and predictability essential to international business
transactions.' 3 A contractual provision such as an agreement to
arbitrate, which specifies in advance the forum where disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied, "obviates the danger
that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a fo-
rum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar
with the problem area involved. 11 4 Consequently, the Scherk
decision did not overrule Wilko, but created a limited exception
applicable only to international transactions. 15
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Scherk, emphasized the Se-
curities Act's purpose of investor protection. ' 6 The dissent ex-
plained that the nonwaiver provision of section 29(a), coupled
with the loss of rights associated with arbitration proceedings,
dictates that the international aspects of an agreement should
not deprive an investor of the protection afforded by the
courts. 7 It concluded that when a defendant has "brought itself
within the ken of federal securities regulation, . those
laws - including the controlling principles of Wilko - apply
110. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-19.
111. Id. at 515.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 516.
114. Id. (footnote omitted). "A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to
enforce an international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes,
but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure
tactical litigation advantages." Id. at 516-17.
115. Newman, 383 F. Supp. at 268.
116. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 523-24. Justice Douglas delivered the dissenting opinion in
which Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined.
117. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 527 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1988]
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
whether the defendant is foreign or American, and whether or
not there are transnational elements in the dealings." '
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,"9 the Supreme
Court was once again afforded the opportunity to address the
issue of enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements
under the Exchange Act, and once again the Court declined to
resolve the issue. 120 In Byrd, an investor brought suit against a
securities broker-dealer alleging violations of sections 10(b),
15(c), and 20 of the Exchange Act as well as violations of various
state law provisions. 2 ' Upon entering into the investment, Byrd
signed a standard customer contract which included an arbitra-
tion agreement. 122 Dean Witter filed a motion to sever the pen-
dent 123 state claims, compel arbitration of same, and stay arbi-
tration of those claims pending resolution of the federal court
action. 2 " Dean Witter argued that the Arbitration Act required
the Court to compel arbitration of the state law claims. 26 How-
ever, Dean Witter assumed that the arbitration agreement did
not govern the federal securities claim, and therefore did not
move to compel arbitration of that claim. 126 As a consequence of
Dean Witter's failure to ask the Court to compel arbitration of
the federal securities claim, the question of whether the Wilko
doctrine applies to the Exchange Act was not properly before
the Court and could not be ruled upon. 27
118. Id. at 533.
119. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
120. Id. at 223.
121. Id. at 214 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c), 78t (1982)).
122. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215.
123. Pendent jurisdiction is defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1021 (5th ed. 1979):
"Original jurisdiction resting under federal claim extends to any nonfederal claim against
same defendant if the federal question is substantial and the federal and nonfederal
claims constitute a single cause of action." See generally Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pen-
dent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1968).
124. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215.
125. Id. Dean Witter based this argument on section 2 of the Arbitration Act. Id.
See supra text accompanying note 20 for text of section 2 of the Arbitration Act.
126. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215. As support for this belief, the Court cited Wilko and
stated that, despite the Supreme Court's recent doubts regarding the Wilko doctrine's
applicability to the Exchange Act, "Wilko has retained considerable vitality in the lower
federal courts." Id. at 215-16 n.1.
127. Id. at 215. "In the District Court, Dean Witter did not seek to compel arbitra-
tion of the federal securities claims. Thus, the question whether Wilko applies to § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 claims is not properly before us." The Court further stated that although
[Vol. 8:193
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The issue in Byrd thus became "whether to compel arbitra-
tion of the pendent state-law claims when the federal court will
in any event assert jurisdiction over a [related] federal-law
claim .... ,1128 First, the Byrd Court rejected the "intertwining
doctrine," which states that when "arbitrable and nonarbitrable
claims arise out of the same transaction, and are sufficiently in-
tertwined factually and legally, the district court ... may in its
discretion deny arbitration as to the arbitrable claims and try all
the claims together in federal court."1' 2 Next, relying on the leg-
islative history of the Arbitration Act, the court noted that the
goal of the Arbitration Act is to "ensure judicial enforcement of
privately made agreements to arbitrate... [rather than] to pro-
mote the expeditious resolution of claims."'3 0 Indeed, the House
Report accompanying the Arbitration Act clearly states that the
Act's purpose is "to place an arbitration agreement 'upon the
same footing as other contracts, where it belongs,' . . . and to
overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate."'' The Byrd Court concluded that Congress
clearly intended that courts must "rigorously enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate, even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation, at
least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another fed-
eral statute.' ' 3 2 Based on the foregoing, the Byrd Court held
that it was obligated to compel arbitration of the pendent arbi-
trable claims even though bifurcated proceedings would
"Dean Witter and amici representing the securities industry urge us to resolve the appli-
cability of Wilko .. .we decline to do so." Id. at 215-16 n.1.
128. Id. at 216.
129. Id. at 216-17 (footnote omitted). See generally Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing intertwining doctrine);
Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 785 F.2d 1274,
1279 (5th Cir. 1986) (The purpose of the now rejected intertwining doctrine was to pre-
serve the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over Securities Act claims and to promote
efficiency. Byrd's rejection of the intertwining doctrine was founded on a congressional
desire to enforce arbitration agreements.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3211 (1987).
130. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219. The Court stated that the Arbitration Act "does not
mandate the arbitration of all claims, but merely the enforcement - upon the motion
of one of the parties - of privately negotiated arbitration agreements." Id.
131. Id. at 219-20 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)) (footnote
omitted).
132. Id. at 221. The Court noted that bifurcated or piecemeal litigation might be the
result if a court is confronted with a section 12(2) claim under the Securities Act as well
as a pendent state law claim. The Court further observed that if Wilko were applied to
claims arising under the Exchange Act, the same situation would arise. Id. at 218 n.5.
19881
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result.133
Although the issue of the enforceability of predispute arbi-
tration agreements under the Exchange Act was not squarely
before the Court, Justice White, in a concurring opinion, cast
"substantial doubt" as to whether such agreements would be
found unenforceable."" Relying on the express language of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, Justice White used reason-
ing similar to that of the majority in Scherk and decided that
the provisions, while similar, were not identical and therefore
could not produce identical results. 3 5 Specifically, Justice White
stated that although section 29 of the Exchange Act is
equivalent to section 14 of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act
counterparts of section 12(2) and section 22 of the Securities Act
are "imperfect or absent altogether.' ' 3 6 Justice White empha-
sized that jurisdiction under the Exchange Act is more restric-
tive than under the Securities Act and that a cause of action
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is implied rather than ex-
press.137 Lastly, he indicated that "Wilko's solicitude for the fed-
eral cause of action - the 'special right' established by Con-
gress - is not necessarily appropriate where the cause of action
is judicially implied and not so different from the common-law
action."' ' Based on the differences in the express language of
the statutes, Justice White concluded that "Wilko's reasoning
cannot be mechanically transplanted to the [Exchange] Act," 139
and therefore, "the contrary holdings of the lower courts must
be viewed with some doubt.' ' 40
133. Id. at 223-24. For a discussion of Byrd and the intertwining doctrine, see Note,
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd: The Unraveling of the Intertwining Doctrine, 62
DEN. U.L. REV. 789 (1985) (tracing the evolution of the conflict regarding the intertwining
doctrine and discussing the arguments presented in Byrd).
134. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224 (White, J., concurring). Justice White participated in the
dissenting argument in Scherk. See supra text accompanying notes 116-118. His opinion
in Byrd therefore represents a reversal, at least in part, of his view on this issue.
135. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 224.
137. Id. at 224-25.
138. Id. at 225 (citation and footnote omitted).
139. Id. at 224.
140. Id. at 225.
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3. Confusion Leads to a Split Among Federal Courts
Since Byrd, most federal district courts that have consid-
ered whether predispute arbitration agreements are enforceable
for claims arising under the Exchange Act have followed Justice
White's concurrence in Byrd and held such claims arbitrable.""
Among the circuit courts of appeals, however, predispute arbi-
tration agreements have not fared as well, with the majority of
the circuit courts holding the agreements unenforceable with re-
spect to claims brought under the Exchange Act.1""
The first case involving the arbitrability issue to reach the
circuit court level after Byrd was McMahon v. Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, Inc.14 The investor in McMahon brought suit
against the broker for misrepresentation and "churning"144 of
accounts in violation of the Exchange Act. The action also in-
volved a RICO claim 4 5 and state law claims for fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty. 46
Applying the decision of the Supreme Court in Byrd, the
Second Circuit in McMahon compelled arbitration of the pen-
dent state law claims even though bifurcated proceedings re-
141. Schriner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 635 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Fisher v.
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 234 (D. Md. 1986); Prawer v. Dean Wit-
ter Reynolds, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 642 (D. Mass. 1985); West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., 623 F. Supp. 26 (W.D. Wash. 1985). Contra Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 634 F.
Supp. 587 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Bale v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 650 (D.
Minn. 1986).
142. See cases cited infra note 187.
143. 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2332, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 31
(1987).
144. Churning occurs when a securities broker engages in excessively large and fre-
quent transactions in the investor's account for the purpose of generating commissions,
acting in disregard of the client's interest. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318,
324 (5th Cir. 1981). To establish a claim for churning, the investor must prove: "(1) the
trading in his [investor's] account was excessive in light of his investment objectives; (2)
the broker in question exercised control over the trading in the account; and (3) the
broker acted with the intent to defraud or with willful and reckless disregard for the
investor's interests ...." Id. at 324 (citations omitted). If proven, the broker may be
held liable for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. See generally Note, Churn-
ing by Securities Dealers, 80 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1967).
145. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),
makes it unlawful for a person employed or associated with enterprises engaged in inter-
state commerce to conduct affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt. Many of the cases discussed in this Note also involve RICO issues;
however, that is beyond the scope of this Note.
146. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 95.
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suited.14 7 However, a unanimous Second Circuit court refused to
compel arbitration of the section 10(b) claim.148 The court stated
that although Byrd and Scherk "may cast some doubt on
whether the Supreme Court, if presented with the issue, would
hold claims under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to be non-arbitrable, it
would be improvident for us to disregard clear judicial precedent
in this Circuit based on mere speculation."'41 9 In support of this
ruling, the McMahon court looked to the similarity of the provi-
sions of the federal securities acts, to the strong policy concerns
inherent in those acts and to the legislative history thereof. 150
Based on this analysis, the court reaffirmed its previous holdings
that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims are not arbitrable.' 5 '
Noting that the broad policy questions involved in federal secur-
ities law claims require a judicial forum for the resolution of dis-
putes, the McMahon court concluded that Wilko must be ap-
plied to Exchange Act claims.1 52
The Second Circuit again addressed the arbitrability issue
147. Id.
148. Id. However, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the RICO
claims were non-arbitrable. Id.
149. Id. at 98. The court noted that while many district courts have continued to
follow the settled law of the Second Circuit, holding claims under section 10(b) not arbi-
trable, others have "interpreted ...Scherk and Byrd as authority for holding such
claims to be arbitrable." Id. at 97 n.4 (citing Leone v. Advest, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 297
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Weizman v. Adornato, No. 84 Civ. 3603 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1985) (both
cases holding claims not arbitrable); Finkle & Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F.
Supp. 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Jarvis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1146
(D.Vt. 1985) (both cases holding claims to be arbitrable)).
150. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98. The customer agreement signed by McMahon con-
tained the following arbitration provision:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or
relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules,
then in effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards
of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock
Exchange, Inc. as I may elect.
Id. at 94.
151. Id. at 97. See, e.g., Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1103
(2d Cir. 1970) ("question concerning fraud within the meaning of Rule 10b-5 is properly
litigated in the courts where a complete record is kept of the proceedings and findings
and conclusions are made"); AFP Imaging Corp. v. Ross, 780 F.2d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 1985)
(arbitration clauses in contracts claims brought under the Exchange Act are "unenforce-
able under the law of this Circuit"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3295 (1986).
152. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98.
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in Intre Sport Ltd. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.'"3 In that case,
Intre Sport alleged claims arising under section 12(2) of the Se-
curities Act as well as various common law breaches of contract,
breaches of fiduciary duty and fraud. 6 The district court dis-
missed the section 12(2) claim because it was time-barred and
held that the section 10(b) claims were to be arbitrated. 155 The
district court reasoned that the doubts raised in Byrd and
Scherk, combined with the Supreme Court's renewed vigor in
enforcing agreements to arbitrate under the Arbitration Act,'16
and the significant differences between the substantive rights of
action available under the Exchange Act and those available
under the Securities Act, compelled a holding which would refer
the claims to arbitration.'17 However, as a result of subsequent
Second Circuit decisions in AFP Imaging Corp. v. Ross'65 and in
McMahon,'59 which held that section 10(b) claims are not arbi-
trable, the district court in Intre Sport subsequently modified
its opinion and reinstated the Exchange Act claims, thereby re-
fusing arbitration.'60 The district court concluded that the "Sec-
ond Circuit's explicit, if unexplained, endorsement of the contin-
ued nonarbitrability of federal securities law claims" must
control.' 61 The Second Circuit affirmed the modified holding
without opinion.' 62 In so doing, the Second Circuit once again
reaffirmed its pre-Byrd holdings.
The Ninth Circuit, in Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
153. 625 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), modified, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,714 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd mem, 795 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1986),
vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3203 (1987).
154. Intre Sport Ltd., 625 F. Supp. at 1304.
155. Id. at 1312.
156. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1982) ("[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration .... ); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
473 U.S. 614 (1985) (federal antitrust claims in the international context held not
arbitrable).
157. Intre Sport Ltd., 625 F. Supp. at 1315.
158. 780 F.2d 202; see supra note 151.
159. 788 F.2d 94; see supra text accompanying notes 143-152.
160. Intre Sport Ltd., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,714 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
161. Id.
162. Intre Sport Ltd., 795 F.2d at 1004.
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Inc.,'68 joined the majority of circuit courts in holding predis-
pute arbitration agreements unenforceable as to claims brought
under the Exchange Act.'4 While the nonarbitrability of section
10(b) claims had already been the rule in the Ninth Circuit,16 5
Conover was the first post-Byrd Ninth Circuit ruling on the is-
sue. In reaching its decision, the court examined the text and
the legislative and judicial history of the Exchange Act, with an
eye toward the purposes underlying the federal securities laws
and the Arbitration Act.'66 Although the court recognized the
strong federal policy evidenced in the Arbitration Act, it stated
that the Arbitration Act "does not automatically validate an ar-
bitration agreement in the face of contrary congressional pol-
icy.' 6 7 The court cited Wilko in support of this statement. 6 8 In
determining congressional intent, the court pointed to the non-
waiver provisions of the two acts as a clear indication that Con-
gress intended to prohibit waiver of the right to a judicial
forum. 69
Because the Exchange Act lacks an express provision for a
private right of action under section 10(b), the Conover court
turned for guidance to the legislative and regulatory history of
the Exchange Act. 7 0 It found that not only is an implied cause
of action for section 10(b) claims well established, "its nonwaiv-
able character has become well accepted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the courts of appeals, and Congress it-
163. 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3203 (1987).
164. Id. at 527.
165. Id. at 521. The court cited post-Wilko/pre-Byrd Ninth Circuit decisions which
held Exchange Act claims non-arbitrable. Id. (citing Kehr v. Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., 736 F.2d 1283, 1285 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984); Kershaw v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., 734 F.2d 1327, 1328 (9th Cir. 1984); De Lancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d
1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1981)).
166. Conover, 794 F.2d at 523-24.
167. Id. at 522.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 523. See supra note 89 and accompanying text, and text accompanying
note 67. Accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827
(10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831,
835-36 (7th Cir. 1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d
532, 536 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976). All of these cases rely on the
similarity between the nonwaiver provisions contained in the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act.
170. Conover, 794 F.2d at 523-24.
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self.' 1 7 1 In support of this contention, the court observed that,
"[in 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued
[Rule 15c2-2], a release warning broker-dealers that customers
should be made aware that they have a right to a judicial forum
to pursue claims under both the [Securities] and [Exchange]
Acts, notwithstanding their arbitration agreements.' 7 2 Of fur-
ther significance to the court was Congress' failure to eliminate
the federal cause of action for section 10(b) claims when the op-
portunity arose in 1975 during major revisions of the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act. 73
Finally, the Conover court noted that, in 1975, Congress ex-
pressly recognized the nonarbitrable nature of disputes between
brokers and customers 174 by "emphasiz[ing] that its amendment
to section 28 of the [Exchange Act], which permitted arbitration
agreements between brokers and exchanges, did not extend to
arbitration agreements between brokers and customers ... ."175
The Conover court stated that this legislative history demanded
a conclusion that predispute arbitration agreements are unen-
forceable with regard to claims brought under the Exchange
Act. 76
The Wilko doctrine was the final factor examined by the
court in Conover. Reviewing the Wilko considerations favoring
nonarbitrability in the context of the case at bar, the Conover
court concluded that the Wilko doctrine applied with "equal
171. Id. at 524; see supra note 87.
172. Conover, 794 F.2d at 524 (citing Notice to Broker-Dealers Concerning Clauses
in Customer Agreements which Provide for Arbitration of Future Disputes, Exchange
Act Release No. 15,984 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,122 (July 2,
1979)). The rule stated:
It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a broker or
dealer to enter into an agreement with any public customer which purports to
bind the customer to the arbitration of future disputes between them arising
under the Federal securities laws, or to have in effect such an agreement, pursuant
to which it effects transactions with or for a customer.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a) (1987).
173. Id. at 524.
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 321, 342). See Weissbuch, 558 F.2d at 836 ("Congress
appears to have accepted the view that Wilko ... applies in the lOb-5 context."); Ayres,
538 F.2d at 536-37 (interpreting report the same way).
176. Conover, 794 F.2d at 524.
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force" to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.177 This reasoning
was based on the court's opinion that the bargaining position
between customers and dealers is the same regardless of which
Act the claim falls under. "Dealers are as likely to 'maneuver
buyers into a position that might weaken their ability to recover'
under the [Exchange] Act as they are under the [Securities]
Act.""' 8 Similarily, the need for judicial supervision to protect
parties' rights is as compelling under the Exchange Act as it is
under the Securities Act.7 9 Additionally, the special jurisdic-
tional and procedural protections afforded by the Securities Act,
which the Wilko Court found to weigh heavily against arbi-
trability, are present in the Exchange Act as well. 80 In Wilko,
the Court stated that a securities customer "surrenders more by
agreeing to arbitrate claims under the [Securities] Act than
would a person who agrees to arbitrate a normal business trans-
action claim." '81 Similarly, the Conover court found that under
the Exchange Act, a securities customer has advantages not af-
forded the average business customer. There is no diversity re-
quirement for a section 10(b) claim, there is no amount in con-
troversy requirement, and the 10(b) plaintiff has greater service-
of-process and venue options than does a diversity plaintiff.8 2
Finally, the Conover court compared the Exchange Act's ju-
risdiction provision with the corresponding provision in the Se-
curities Act.183 The court noted that "while the [Securities] Act
grants concurrent jurisdiction to federal and state courts, the
[Exchange] Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
177. Id. at 525.
178. Id. (citation omitted).
i79. Id. at 526 (citation omitted). See Schecter, 422 F.2d at 1103 (a "question con-
cerning fraud within the meaning of Rule 10b-5 is properly litigated in the courts where
a complete record is kept of the proceedings and findings and conclusions are made.");
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436 ("As [the arbitrators'] award may be made without explanation of
their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators' concep-
tion of the legal meaning of ... statutory requirements ... cannot be examined.").
180. Conover, 794 F.2d at 525.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 526.
183. Id. at 527. The court compared section 27 of the Exchange Act ("any district
where the defendant is found, inhabits or transacts business, or 'where any act or trans-
action constituting the violation occurred' ") with section 22 of the Securities Act ("any
district where the defendant is found, inhabits or transacts business, 'or in the district
where the offer of sale took place' "). Id.
[Vol. 8:193
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss1/5
McMAHON
courts." 8" The court found that this distinction strongly evi-
denced "Congress' intent that federal courts oversee the inter-
pretation and application of the [Exchange] Act." ' 5 The Ninth
Circuit concluded in Conover that Congress intended to pre-
clude arbitration agreements under the Exchange Act and that
its decision "comports with the legislative history and purposes
of the [Exchange] Act, as well as with the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis of similar claims under the [Securities] Act." 86
Although seven additional circuit courts of appeals have
agreed with the Ninth Circuit holding and held predispute arbi-
tration agreements under the Exchange Act unenforceable, the
First and Eighth Circuits have declined to follow suit.""7 Relying
on the doubts raised in Scherk and Byrd, and on the strong fed-
eral policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements,
the Eighth Circuit, in Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, ' ruled that claims arising under a violation of section
10(b) of the Exchange Act are arbitrable.18 9 The investor in
Phillips, upon opening a securities account with Merrill Lynch,
signed a standard customer agreement which provided that "any
controversies relating to the account shall be submitted to arbi-
tration."1 90 Phillips sued the brokerage firm, alleging violations
of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and section 12(2) of the
Securities Act.1 91 Merrill Lynch then moved, pursuant to the
184. Id.; see supra note 88.
185. Conover, 794 F.2d at 527.
186. Id.
187. Compare McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.
1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2332, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 31 (1987); Jacobson v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct.
3204 (1987); King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1986); Mans-
bach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Weissbuch v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Conover v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3203 (1987);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978);
Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986) (all holding
predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable) with Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Es-
tabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3218 (1987)
(holding predispute arbitration agreements enforceable).
188. 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3218 (1987).
189. Id. at 1399.
190. Id. at 1394.
191. Id.
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parties' arbitration agreement, to compel arbitration of the Ex-
change Act claim."'
In its decision, the Phillips court emphasized, that the "cen-
terpiece provision of the ... Arbitration Act provides that arbi-
tration agreements shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract.' 9 3 According to the court, recent inter-
pretation by the Supreme Court of this and other provisions of
the Arbitration Act reflected a "strong federal policy favoring
the enforcement of arbitration agreements."'19 4 Citing Byrd, the
Phillips court noted that "[t]he preeminent concern of Congress
in passing the [Arbitration] Act was to enforce private agree-
ments into which parties had entered, and that concern requires
that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."'195
The Phillips court found additional support for its decision
in Swink & Co. v. Hereth,'9 where the Eighth Circuit held that
the Wilko doctrine does not void arbitration agreements be-
tween municipal bond dealers and members of a stock ex-
change. 97 The court reasoned that the Swink holding suggested
that Wilko should be "contained rather than expanded." 98 The
Phillips court also pointed to Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc."99 as an illustration of the Supreme
Court's recognition of the value of arbitration in a commercial
context. 00 In Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court stated that there is
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1395. See supra text accompanying note 20.
194. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1395.
195. Id. n.5.
196. 784 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1986).
197. Id. at 868. The Swink court stated that there is a recognized exception to the
Wilko Doctrine when the dispute is intra-industry in nature. Id. See Halliburton & As-
socs., Inc. v. Henderson, Few & Co., 774 F.2d 441 (11th Cir. 1985) (ruling that predispute
arbitration agreements are unenforceable with respect to claims under section 12(2) does
not apply to disputes between members of the stock exchange).
While the Phillips court found support for arbitration in the Swink's reasoning,
other courts have indicated that this has no bearing on agreements between brokers and
investors. See, e.g., McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98 (The Second Circuit has not recognized an
exception to the non-arbitrability of securities law claims in circumstances other than
disputes between member firms of the stock exchanges.). See also supra text accompa-
nying note 175.
198. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1399.
199. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
200. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1395. But see Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202. (The issue in
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a "strong presumption in favor of freely negotiated contractual
choice-of-forum provisions." 10' The Mitsubishi Court further
stated that
[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only sub-
mits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, fo-
rum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and [speed] of arbitra-
tion. We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive
protection afforded by a given statute to include protection
against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will
be deducible from text or legislative history.2 '
The Phillips court dismissed the applicability of the Wilko
doctrine to Exchange Act claims with reasoning similar to that
found in Scherk and Byrd, by pointing to differences in the ju-
risdictional and civil liability provisions of the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act.20 8 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit stated
in Phillips that the nonwaiver provision of the Exchange Act
"does not override the Arbitration Act in the same manner as
section 14 of the [Securities] Act when it is not buttressed by
special rights and broad jurisdictional provisions similar to those
found in the [Securities] Act." 04
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the Phillips court
recognized that while many courts of appeals have held that the
Wilko reasoning extends to claims arising under the Exchange
Act, "[recent Supreme Court pronouncements indicate.., that
this remains an open question." ' The court noted that it was
faced with no Eighth Circuit precedent and explained that it
would ordinarily avoid creating a conflict among the circuits. 0
However, the Phillips court continued, the Scherk and Byrd
opinions "invite a reexamination of the applicability of Wilko to
Mitsubishi was different because it involved interpretation of arbitration agreements,
not federal statutes that prohibit the application of forum selection clauses.).
201. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 615.
202. Id. at 628.
203. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1397.
204. Id. at 1398 (footnote omitted).
205. Id. at 1396.
206. Id. at 1399-1400.
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claims arising under section 10(b) of the [Exchange] Act ... , 2o
Based on the foregoing, and in the absence of a contrary Su-
preme Court holding, the Phillips court ruled that predispute
arbitration agreements are enforceable for claims arising under
the Exchange Act.20
s
III. Arbitration or Litigation? The Supreme Court Ruling in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon
In a long awaited opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the
Supreme Court, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon,2°9 held that predispute agreements to arbitrate Exchange
Act claims are enforceable.21 0 In a five to four opinion, the Court
reversed the Second Circuit decision in McMahon,211 and im-
plicitly overruled precedent in seven additional circuits. 1 2
A. The Majority Opinion
Citing Scherk,21 ' Byrd,21 4 Moses H. Cone, 21' and Mitsub-
ishi,210 the Court began its opinion in McMahon by stressing the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration.2 " The Court noted
that not only is the "duty to enforce arbitration agreements...
not diminished" 21 8 merely because the claim is based on a statu-
207. Id. at 1400.
208. Id.
209. 107 S. Ct. 2332, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 31 (1987). Justice O'Connor delivered
the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Powell,
and Scalia joined. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, filed an
opinion dissenting with respect to the arbitrability of Exchange Act claims, but con-
curred with the holding of the second issue raised in this case - that of the arbi-
trability of RICO claims. See supra note 145. Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion, also
concurred in part and dissented in part.
210. Id. at 2343.
211. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2332, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 31 (1987).
212. Eight circuit courts of appeals - the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh - have held predispute arbitration agreements unenforce-
able for claims arising under the Exchange Act. The First and Eighth Circuits have held
such agreements arbitrable. See cases cited supra, note 187.
213. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
214. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
215. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
216. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
217. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337.
218. Id.
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tory right, but the time has passed when " 'judicial suspicion of
the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral
tribunals' [will] inhibit enforcement of the [Arbitration]
Act. .. ."219 With regard to the case before it, the Court ex-
plained that, since the burden is on the party opposing arbitra-
tion, McMahon "must demonstrate that Congress intended to
make an exception to the Arbitration Act for claims arising
under ... the Exchange Act, an intention discernable from the
text, history, or purposes of the statute."220
Following this rationale, the Court systematically rejected
each of McMahon's arguments. First, the Court rejected the pro-
position that section 29(a), the nonwaiver provision of the Ex-
change Act, bars waiver of section 27, the jurisdictional provi-
sion."1 The Court explained that although section 29(a) forbids
enforcement of agreements to waive "compliance" with provi-
sions of the Exchange Act, "[section] 27 itself does not impose
any duty with which persons trading in securities must 'comply.'
... Because [section] 27 does not impose any statutory duties,
its waiver does not constitute a waiver of 'compliance with any
provision' of the Exchange Act under [s]ection 29(a). 22 2 In its
attempt to reconcile this reasoning with Wilko's 223 holding that
section 14 of the Securities Act bars a waiver of section 22(a),
the Court stated that Wilko's conclusion was based on the belief
that the rights created by the Securities Act could only be pro-
tected in a judicial forum.224 The McMahon Court emphasized
that "Wilko must be understood ... as holding that the plain-
tiffs waiver of the 'right to select the judicial forum,' was unen-
forceable only because arbitration was judged inadequate to en-
force the statutory rights created by § 12(2)." 22 However, the
Court explained, where arbitration provides an adequate forum
for enforcing the Exchange Act's provisions, section 29(a) will
not void the waiver of section 27 of that Act. In support of its
conclusion, the McMahon Court cited the Scherk holding with
219. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627).
220. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337-38.
221. Id. at 2338.
222. Id.
223. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
224. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
225. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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approval.2 26
The Court refused to accept McMahon's argument that ar-
bitration lessens an investor's rights and hence his ability to re-
cover under the Exchange Act,227 pointing out that Wilko's rea-
sons for mistrusting the arbitral process have subsequently been
rejected by the Court.2 8 According to the Court, the Scherk de-
cision established that arbitral forums are capable of resolving
section 10(b) claims in an international context.229 Moreover, the
Court noted that arbitrators are considered competent to resolve
section 10(b) claims between members of the Securities Ex-
change, concluding that the resolution of section 10(b) claims re-
quires the same abilities regardless of who the parties are and
whether it is an international or domestic dispute.23
Finally, the Court disagreed with McMahon's contention
that certain action and inaction by Congress over the past years
has indicated an intention to void predispute agreements to ar-
bitrate Exchange Act claims.231 In support of this argument, Mc-
Mahon pointed to Congress' failure during the 1975 revisions of
the Exchange Act to provide for the arbitrability of section 10(b)
claims.23 2 In addition, McMahon identified a conference report,
issued during the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, which
stated that "[iut was the clear understanding of the conferees
that this amendment did not change existing law, as articulated
in Wilko .... ",233 McMahon argued that the conferees were
aware of lower court rulings extending Wilko to Exchange Act
claims, and by this language implicitly approved those rulings.234
The Court dismissed these arguments by stating first that
the 1975 revisions were "intended to 'clarify the scope of the
226. Id. at 2339.
227. Id. at 2339-40. The McMahon court stated that this fear was at the "heart" of
the Wilko decision. Id. The Wilko Court was primarily concerned with the fact that
arbitrators had to make legal determinations without explanation, reasons, or a written
record, and that the arbitrators' decision, barring fraud or disregard of the law, is not
subject to "judicial review for error in interpretation." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-37.
228. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2340-41.
231. Id. at 2342-43.
232. Id. at 2342.
233. Id. at 2343 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111, reprinted
in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 342).
234. Id. at 2343.
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self-regulatory responsibilities of national securities exchanges
and registered securities associations . . . and the manner in
which they are to exercise those responsibilities.' "235 The revi-
sions failed to mention either customers or arbitration. There-
fore, the Court concluded, the revisions were directed at a differ-
ent problem and consequently had no bearing on this issue.
Second, addressing the sentence in the Conference Report
quoted by McMahon, the Court found that Congress could not
extend Wilko to the Exchange Act without enacting a law to
that effect. 23 6 In addition, the "quoted sentence does not disclose
what committee members thought 'existing law' provided. 2 37 It
is quite likely, the Supreme Court posited, that Congress
thought the law was as espoused in Scherk - that it was
doubtful that Wilko would be extended to 10(b) claims.238 Based
on the foregoing, the Court concluded that "Congress did not
intend for section 29(a) to bar enforcement of . . . predispute
arbitration agreements ' 3  and that, because arbitration is an
adequate forum within which parties' rights in a section 10(b)
claim will not be diminished, the arbitration agreements should
be held valid.2 4
B. The Dissent
In a strong dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that the major-
ity decision "approves the abandonment of the judiciary's role in
the resolution of claims under the Exchange Act and leaves such
claims to the arbitral forum of the securities industry at a time
when the industry's abuses towards investors are more apparent
then ever. '24 1 The dissent referred to the current issue as one
which had been "kept alive inappropriately ' 2 by the Supreme
Court and indicated that the "colorable argument" advanced in
235. Id. at 2342 (quoting S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1975)).
236. Id. at 2343.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2346 (Blackmun, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part). See
supra note 209.
242. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2346 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
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Scherk belonged in the "graveyard of ideas. ' 24 3 Even the major-
ity was aware of this, the dissent argued, since nowhere in the
opinion did they rely on the "colorable argument. 24
The dissent articulated three major areas of faulty analysis
in the majority's opinion. First, the dissent referred to the 1975
congressional amendments to the Exchange Act. Of significance
to the dissent was the conferees' statement that existing law
under Wilko was not changed by the amendments. This, said
the dissent, "on its face indicates that Congress did not want the
amendments to overrule Wilko. Moreover, the fact that this
statement was made in an amendment to the Exchange Act sug-
gests that Congress was aware of the extension of Wilko to
§ 10(b) claims. '24'  The dissent further stated that, while this
sentence is not a conclusive congressional endorsement of this
extension, "in the absence of any prior congressional indication
to the contrary, it implies that Congress was not concerned with
arresting [the] trend. 2 46 The dissent concluded that Congress
approved the extension of Wilko to Exchange Act claims.4 7
Next, the dissent stated that the Court read Wilko too nar-
rowly in order to fit it "into the syllogism offered by the Com-
mission and accepted by the Court."2 8 The dissent criticized the
majority's finding that the main concern behind the Wilko deci-
sion was the adequacy of arbitration.2 9 Citing the prior Su-
preme Court opinion in Mitsubishi, the dissent argued that
Wilko is properly viewed as standing for the proposition "that
the text and legislative history of the Securities Act - not gen-
eral problems with [airbitration," are the reasons claims brought
under the Securities Act are excepted from the provisions of the
Arbitration Act.250 The dissent emphasized that although Wilko
discussed the inadequacies of the arbitration process, its holding
was actually based on the language, legislative history, and poli-
243. Id. at 2347 n.2.
244. Id. at 2346-47.
245. Id. at 2348.
246. Id. (footnote omitted).
247. Id. at 2349.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2349-50.
250. Id. at 2350.
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cies underlying the Securities Act. 51 In support of this conten-
tion, the dissent pointed to the Securities Act's purpose of pro-
tecting investors and proceeded to engage in an analysis of
Wilko similar to that found in Conover2 52 and the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in McMahon.2 5' Relying on Wilko as a correctly
decided case, the dissent drew parallels between the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act.25" It stated that the nonwaiver provi-
sions of each Act are "virtually identical," and that both Acts
were designed with a "common purpose" in mind - investor
protection.255 The dissent argued that a proper reading of Wilko
leads to the conclusion that "the same reasons that led the
Court to find an exception to the Arbitration Act for 12(2)
claims exist for §10(b) claims as well. 2 56
Finally, the dissent stated that "the Court accepts uncriti-
cally petitioners' and the [Securities and Exchange] Commis-
sion's argument that the problems with arbitration, highlighted
by the Wilko Court, either no longer exist or are now not viewed
as problems by the Court. '25 7 The dissent pointedly observed
that the majority did not specifically mention exactly what im-
provements had been made in arbitration since Wilko. Accord-
ing to the dissent, although improvements had been made in ar-
bitration, "several aspects of arbitration that were seen by the
Wilko court [sic] to be inimical to the policy of investor protec-
tion still remain.21 58 In support of this statement, the dissent
noted that, as in Wilko's time, arbitrators are still not required
to produce a record of the proceedings, or an opinion; they are
not bound by precedent; and judicial review is only granted on
one of the four grounds specified in section 10 of the Arbitration
Act.259 At best, the dissent emphasized, an investor will be
placed on an equal footing with the securities firm; however, at
worst, the investor is forced into a forum controlled by the se-
251. Id. at 2352.
252. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated,
107 S. Ct. 3203 (1987).
253. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2350-53 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 2353.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2350.
258. Id. at 2353.
259. Id. at 2354-55. See supra note 75 for text of § 10 of the Arbitration Act.
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curities industry.26 This, the dissent concluded, "directly con-
tradicts the goal of both securities acts to free the investor from
the control of the market professional. 26
1
IV. Analysis
The inherent conflict between the Arbitration Act and the
Exchange Act does not invite easy resolution. The state of disa-
greement among the circuit courts of appeals, combined with the
five to four split in McMahon,2 2 clearly indicates that the scale
weighs heavily on both sides.
The policy of enforcing arbitration agreements is generally
strong. Not only does the Arbitration Act expressly state that
such a provision "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, '26"
but Supreme Court decisions prior to McMahon have demon-
strated an increased preference for arbitration. 64 In Byrd, 66 the
Court so strongly believed that arbitration agreements should be
enforced, that it expressed its willingness to withstand ineffi-
cient, piecemeal litigation in order to uphold the arbitration
agreement. In McMahon, the Court reaffirmed its favorable atti-
tude toward arbitration.
Opposing the applicability of arbitration for claims arising
under the Exchange Act are strong policies deeply rooted in the
substance and procedure of the federal securities laws. Here,
protection of the investor is of paramount concern. In Wilko,26 6
the Court indicated that the goal of investor protection is em-
bodied in the special right created by section 12(2) which allows
the investor to recover for misrepresentation in a federal forum.
Further protection is afforded through the nonwaiver and forum
selection provisions set forth in sections 14 and 22 of the Securi-
ties Act, respectively.267 The Supreme Court in Wilko stressed
that these protections are necessary because of the unequal bar-
260. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2355 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
261. Id.
262. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, reh'g denied,
108 S. Ct. 31 (1987).
263. See supra text accompanying note 20.
264. See supra text accompanying note 42.
265. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
266. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
267. See supra note 88 and text accompanying note 67.
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gaining position between the parties.288
Nowhere in the federal securities laws or in the legislative
history of such laws is it stated that the investor who purchases
securities under the statutory and regulatory framework of the
Exchange Act is in need of less protection than the investor who
purchases securities regulated under the Securities Act. In Cono-
ver,2 69 the Ninth Circuit recognized that "[djealers are as likely
to 'maneuver buyers into a position that might weaken their
ability to recover,' . . . under the [Exchange] Act as they are
under the [Securities] Act."27
Why should the courts hold their doors open for one inves-
tor but not for another, when they are equally in need of protec-
tion? A number of federal courts have answered this question by
simply observing that the special right provided a section 12(2)
plaintiff does not expressly exist under section 10(b).271 How-
ever, for more than 40 years courts have found an implied right
to a federal cause of action for section 10(b) claims. 2 It is clear
that the courts, in judicially implying a cause of action for sec-
tion 10(b) claims, have recognized the necessity for the deterrent
effect of private enforcement in a judicial forum. The nonwaiver
provisions of both Acts are virtually identical and have not re-
sulted in any discrepancies in the judicial interpretation
thereof. 273 Indeed, the Supreme Court in McMahon did not rely
on a distinction between these two provisions in reaching its
decision.
The judicial forum provisions of the two Acts, however,
have received differing interpretations. In Scherk,174 the Su-
preme Court indicated that choice of forum is more limited
under the Exchange Act (which provides for exclusive jurisdic-
tion of federal courts) than under the Securities Act (which pro-
268. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
269. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated,
107 S. Ct. 3203 (1987).
270. Id. at 525 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432).
271. See supra note 89 for text of § 29(a) of the Exchange Act and text accompany-
ing note 67 for text of § 14 of the Securities Act.
272. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 89 for text of § 29(a) of the Exchange Act and text accompany-
ing note 67 for text of § 14 of the Securities Act.
274. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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vides for concurrent federal and state court jurisdiction).275
However, in Conover, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of federal courts over claims involving the fed-
eral securities laws clearly indicates Congress' strong desire to
ensure parties access to a federal forum for the resolution of the
Exchange Act claims.276 Ultimately, the McMahon Court found
no significance in the differences between the judicial forum pro-
visions of the two Acts, emphasizing that the jurisdiction provi-
sion imposed no "statutory duties" or "substantive obliga-
tions. 2 77 Indeed, it was this interpretation of the jurisdiction
provisions which allowed the McMahon Court to conclude that
the nonwaiver provision of the Exchange Act did not apply to
the jurisdiction provision of that Act. 78
Prior to the McMahon decision, the Commission's position
on the nonarbitrability of Exchange Act claims seemed clear. Its
public statements of policy clearly warned broker-dealers that
they should inform customers of their right to a judicial forum
under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, notwith-
standing the existence of arbitration agreements. 9 The Com-
mission further clarified its position by issuing Rule 15c2-2,
which prohibits broker-dealers from entering into or maintain-
ing agreements with customers purporting to bind them to arbi-
tration pursuant to a predispute arbitration clause.2 0 However,
the Supreme Court claimed that this action was "not based on
any independent analysis of §29(a), but instead '[was] premised
on . . .court of appeals decisions following Wilko, that agree-
ments to arbitrate Rule 10b-5 claims were not, in fact,
arbitrable.' ,281
Critical to the arbitrability issue are the comparative advan-
tages and disadvantages for the plaintiff-investor inherent in ar-
bitration, as opposed to federal litigation. Arbitration is less ex-
275. Id. at 514.
276. Conover, 794 F.2d at 527.
277. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
278. Id.
279. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
281. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341 n.3 (quoting Brief for the Securities and Ex-
change Commission as Amicus Curiae at 18 n.13, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 1 (1987)).
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pensive and less time consuming, an advantage for both the
broker and the investor.282 However, movement away from a
federal forum to an arbitration panel may produce a radically
different final result. As discussed in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of America,283
[a]rbitration carries no right to trial by jury .... Arbitrators do
not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law, [and] they
need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their
proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial
review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial
284
"Arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence. . . .They
may draw on their personal knowledge in making an award....
And the arbitrators need not disclose the facts or reasons behind
their award. 285
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court decision in McMahon
did not rely primarily on the distinctions between the provisions
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Rather, the Court
founded its holding primarily upon the change in the nature of
arbitration over recent years. The Court emphasized that "the
mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opin-
ion in 1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitra-
tion that has prevailed since that time. 2 86 Moreover, the Court
stated, since the 1975 Amendments to the Exchange Act, "the
Commission has had broad authority to oversee and to regulate
the rules adopted by the SRO's [Self-Regulatory Organizations]
relating to customer disputes, including the power to mandate
the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that arbi-
tration procedures adequately protect statutory rights. 2 87 The
Court concluded that "where the [Commission] has sufficient
statutory authority to ensure that arbitration is adequate to vin-
dicate Exchange Act rights, enforcement does not effect a waiver
of 'compliance with any provision' of the Exchange Act under
282. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
283. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
284. Id. at 203.
285. Id. at 203-04 n.4 (citations omitted).
286. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341.
287. Id. (footnote omitted).
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§ 29(a). 285
Clearly, a new era has emerged which favors arbitration.
Members of the exchanges may arbitrate claims between them-
selves; foreign entities may submit disputes with U.S. entities to
arbitration; parties may agree to arbitration after a dispute
arises; and pendent state law claims may be submitted to arbi-
tration even where the principal federal securities claim is not.
McMahon holds that claims arising under the Exchange Act
may be submitted to arbitration pursuant to a predispute agree-
ment. Consequently, it appears that the only federal securities
law claims which may not be submitted to arbitration are those
arising under the Securities Act.289
The Supreme Court has not yet effectively explained the
distinction regarding the nonarbitrability of Securities Act
claims especially in light of its admission that the current arbi-
tration system is a healthy one within which parties may ade-
quately pursue their grievances. The lack of any significant dif-
ferences between the provisions of the Securities Act and those
of the Exchange Act, coupled with the Court's declaration that
Wilko's reasoning is antiquated,290 indicates that the Court may
believe that Securities Act claims should also be subject to arbi-
tration. The issue of Securities Act claims was not before the
Court in McMahon; hence, the Court properly relied on "stare
decisis concerns" as a primary reason for not overruling
Wilko.291 It is likely, however, that when the issue is presented
to the Court, it will abandon the Wilko doctrine. Indeed, the
Court admits, in dicta, that it is difficult to reconcile Wilko with
its subsequent decisions involving the Arbitration Act. 292
Since Exchange Act claims are subject to arbitration agree-
288. Id. at 2343.
289. Because the Supreme Court in McMahon did not explicitly overrule Wilko,
courts that have decided the arbitrability of Securities Act claims have been forced to
hold such claims nonarbitrable. See Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing litigation of Securities Act claims "should proceed simultaneously" with the arbitra-
tion of Exchange Act claims); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey/American Express, Inc.,
No. 85-115, slip op. at 1 (D. Ga. Aug. 14, 1987). "[Ilt is this court's considered opinion
that the Supreme Court [in McMahon] did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaf-
firmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims.").
290. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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ments, and since Securities Act claims will, in all probability,
also be subject to such agreements in the future, it would be
provident for Congress to express this intention clearly by
amending the securities laws. Congress should specify the roles
and duties of the various parties involved. In so doing, it can
insure that the basic policies underlying the federal securities
laws - investor protection, for example - are best served.
Rather than being contained in a standard "boilerplate"
clause buried among other, unrelated provisions, an agreement
to arbitrate should be placed on a separate document and
presented in a clear and conspicuous manner, with full disclo-
sure of the procedure to be followed and the rights which are
being lost. The essential elements of such an agreement should
be (1) a clear and conspicuous waiver; (2) knowledge of the
rights being waived; and (3) evidence that the agreement was
negotiated and entered into freely.
Once it has been determined that the investor knowingly
and voluntarily entered into an arbitration agreement, arbitra-
tion procedures should be administered fairly and uniformly. To
achieve this goal, Congress, in conjunction with the Commission,
should devise a plan whereby the Commission would monitor
and oversee the arbitration process as guardian of the investor.
In conclusion, a valid and fair agreement to resolve a claim in an
arbitral forum which does not act to either party's disadvantage
should be upheld as valid, binding, and enforceable. When the
investor and the broker meet on the same plane, each should be
held to the agreement he bargained for.
V. Conclusion
McMahon9 3 mandates that predispute arbitration agree-
ments are enforceable for claims arising under the Exchange
Act. Prior to this decision, eight of the ten circuit courts which
have addressed this issue held such agreements unenforceable.
In so holding, the circuit courts extended Wilko 94 by drawing
comparisons between the provisions and policies of the Ex-
change Act and the Securities Act. The Supreme Court's hold-
293. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, reh'g denied,
108 S. Ct. 31 (1987).
294. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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ing, however, was based primarily on the improvements in arbi-
tration which it perceived to have occurred since 1953, when
Wilko was decided.
The ramifications of the Supreme Court decision in McMa-
hon are significant. The decision effectively overrules eight cir-
cuit courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit which is gen-
erally considered the "mother court"2 95 on securities issues.
Further, the Court's holding exemplifies its favorable sentiment
toward arbitration. In addition, although the Court does not ex-
pressly overrule Wilko, it restricts the Wilko doctrine to claims
arising under the Securities Act.
In the wake of McMahon, predispute arbitration agree-
ments are enforceable for claims arising under the Exchange
Act, but not for claims arising under the Securities Act. How-
ever, similarities between the Exchange Act and the Securities
Act, coupled with the Court's favorable attitude toward arbitra-
tion, indicate that Securities Act claims may also be subject to
arbitration agreements in the near future. The similar language
found in the two securities Acts, as well as their common goal of
investor protection, indicates that the Acts should be applied
similarly. It seems clear that if arbitration is an adequate and
fair forum for the resolution of Exchange Act claims, it should
also be an adequate forum for the resolution of Securities Act
claims. Indeed, the Supreme Court in McMahon has cast serious
doubt on the continuing viability of Wilko, even with respect to
Securities Act claims. Support for this conclusion is evident
from a careful reading of the Court's opinion. Not only did the
Court find the Commission's increased authority to oversee the
arbitral process compelling, but it implied that the fears ex-
pressed in Wilko regarding the inadequacies of the arbitral pro-
cess, while certainly not valid today, may not have been valid in
Wilko's day either. Therefore, it seems highly likely that, when
provided the opportunity, the Court will hold all securities
claims to be subject to predispute arbitration agreements.
Since claims arising under the federal securities laws will
not be exempt from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, every
effort must be made to continue to provide for adequate investor
protection. Modifications of broker-customer agreements and su-
295. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 761-62 (1975).
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pervision of the arbitral process are steps which must be taken
to insure the protection of the investor. In response to the Su-
preme Court's recent endorsement of the arbitral process, Con-
gress must now take measures to assure that, in the steady move
towards arbitrability, investors' rights are not being unduly
compromised.
Lori Stewart Blea
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